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Abstrak
Artikel ini mengelaborasi bahwa perspektif pluralis dari kalangan mazhab Inggris (English School) menyediakan sejumlah kemungkinan analisis yang
berguna dalam menganalisis kajian Asia Tenggara. Salah satu kontribusi paling penting dari mazhab Inggris adalah menempatkan analisis level
menengah (middle ground) yang acapkali dilupakan dari debat teoritis yang ada.  Hal ini bisa menjembatani diskursus yang dilakukan oleh berbagai
pandangan, apakah mereka kaum realis dan konstruktivis atau realis dan kaum liberal. Hal ini juga bisa memberikan pemahaman yang lebih
beriorientasi sosial atas peran dari sebuah kekuatan besar – ASEAN, sebuah pemahaman yang memberi interpretasi yang lebih arif tentang
Indonesia dan tantangan apa yang dihadapi.
Kata kunci: mazhab Inggris, middle ground, Asia Tenggara, pluralis
Abstract
This article elaborates that a pluralist English School perspective offers a number of possibilities that are useful in analysing SEA. Its prime contribu-
tion is to help locate the middle ground that is often missing from theoretical debates. Thus, it can bridge parallel discourses, whether they be
realist and constructivist, or realist and liberal. It can also provide a socially oriented understanding of the role of great powers – an understanding
that provides a much more subtle interpretation of what Indonesia offers the region, and the challenges it faces there.
Keywords: English School, middle ground, Southeast Asia, Pluralist
INTRODUCTION
“Theorizing” Southeast Asia (SEA) is notoriously
problematic. Collections of theoretical perspectives
(Acharya & Stubbs, 2006; Rüland & Jetschke, 2008)
attest to widely varying views, none of which is wholly
satisfactory on its own. Realists account for the
“power” elements of the SEA story, but not the
“community” elements; liberals understand the
institution-making impetus, but not the rather thin
nature of these institutions; constructivists grasp the
importance of ideas and norms, but sometimes give
more weight to identity than the region can comfort-
ably bear (Narine, 2006); left-oriented theories speak
powerfully to structural constraints, but less convinc-
ingly to agential strategies. None alone can tell a story
that adequately captures all these many contradictory
streams and strands.
Nor is this simply an academic conundrum. All
observers – activists, diplomats, government officials,
television viewers – have a political lens, whether they
acknowledge it or not. The difficulties of framing SEA
therefore do not stay comfortably within academia.
They resurface at the level of expectations, perceptions
and policy, both in SEA and beyond. How SEA is
seen and talked about matters.
“The “English School”, South




PhD graduand, School of Social and Political Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Australia. GPO Box
793, Melbourne, Victoria 3001, Australia
Email: lcquayle@gmail.com
93
This article will suggest that the so-called “English
School” (ES) of International Relations has a useful
contribution to make, and is currently under-ex-
ploited. It will argue that the ES’s capacity to recog-
nize and defend conceptual “in-between” spaces makes
it a natural bridge between realist and constructivist,
statist and liberal, or structural and agential interpreta-
tions. It therefore facilitates a more nuanced – and
sometimes more positive – interpretation of the
region’s dynamics, with implications for our under-
standing of both the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and Indonesia’s role within it.
It is emphatically not being claimed that the ES is a
complete, final, stand-alone answer to the problems of
interpreting SEA’s politics. But its contribution,
though partial, offers a valuable alternative view, which
deserves greater attention.
Furthermore, this is a two-way, open-ended conver-
sation. As Halliday notes, using a theory to look at a
region should never be a one-directional affair (2009,
2). Regions have data and political cultures from
which theories can and should learn. The ES is still
developing, and input from SEA can usefully influ-
ence that development. There is a synergy here that has
not yet been sufficiently exploited.
The argument will be developed as follows. The
first section briefly reviews the key concepts that
characterize the ES’s approach to International
Relations, and relates this perspective to SEA. The
second section suggests two areas where ES theory, by
locating some useful middle ground, can provide a
different view of SEA – and, turning the tables, the
equivalent areas where the theory can gain from
observing ASEAN’s experience. The third repeats this
process, but looks more specifically at the example of
Indonesia. The fourth section evaluates the usefulness
of this theoretical approach, arguing that it makes a
modest but positive contribution to our overall
understanding of political dynamics in SEA, but
contending, too, that the theoretical framework has
much to learn from continued interaction with the
region.
METHODOLOGY
THE ENGLISH SCHOOL AND ASEAN
Key ES ideas
The English School (ES) is best known for its
concept of international society. The basic idea, Buzan
explains, is quite simple: “Just as human beings as
individuals live in societies which they both shape and
are shaped by, so also states live in an international
society which they shape and are shaped by” (2001,
477). But the international version is an anarchical
society. Without a recognized “world government”, it
has to rely on more complicated mechanisms for the
establishment and maintenance of order. The ES’s
hallmark, therefore, is an interest in the inter-state
cooperation and socialization that still exist despite all
the reasons they might be expected not to exist.
It attaches particular importance to the institutions
that underpin that cooperation; however, it under-
stands institutions not primarily in the sense of visible
organizations, but in the sense of underlying sets of
“habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of
common goals” (Bull, 2002, 71). The existence of an
international society therefore presupposes that a
group of states have not only become aware of “com-
mon interests and common values”, but also under-
stand themselves to be “bound by a common set of
rules”, and share in “the working of common institu-
tions”. Bull’s institutions include sovereignty, diplo-
macy, the balance of power, the managerial role of
great powers, and international law (2002, 13, 39).
However, institutions vary in accordance with the
notions of legitimacy prevalent at any given time.
Indeed, for Clark, it is the idea of legitimacy that
makes an international society. Where there is a belief
among states that they are bound to a certain set of
institutions and practices, he argues, there is also an
international society (2005, 23).
ES tradition, however, has never maintained that
international society is the only dynamic at work in the
world. The societal impulse shares the stage with
powerful patterns of inter-state rivalry on the one
hand, and various kinds of state-transcending ideology
on the other. Wight’s “three traditions” (realism,
JURNAL HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
VOL. 2 NO. 2 / OKTOBER 201394
pragmatic internationalism, and universalism) clearly
articulate a realm of political plurality (1991), and
there is never any guarantee that the middle (societal)
element in this conversation will survive (Bull, 2002,
39). While remaining aware of these competing
strands, ES scholarship has traditionally focused on
the middle-ground tradition of international society –
precisely because this is the one that is most easily
squeezed out by the loud voices of power and
transnationalism on either side.
On a rough spectrum of ideas and theories, then,
the ES’s points of emphasis (on society, order, and
inter-state social relations) would sit somewhere
between realism (with its focus on anarchy, power, and
inter-state competition) and the various transnational
theories (liberal, Marxist, religious, and so on), which
in different ways focus on transcending the state to
reach emancipation in a borderless world. In its belief
in the possibility of political progress, likewise, the ES
sits somewhere between realism (where power patterns
endlessly repeat themselves) and liberalism (which
tends to the teleological). In its interpretation of
power, it sits somewhere between realism (with its
focus on material power) and constructivism (with its
focus on ideational power).
It would be a mistake, however, to think of these
categories as rigidly separated. They are more like
pools of paint on a palette, which blend into each
other at the edges. On a narrower theoretical spectrum
– ranging, for example, from classical realism (à la
Morgenthau), through ES ideas, to thin
constructivism (à la Wendt) – there is considerable
overlap at the edges.
It would also be a mistake to think of ES middle
ground as the grey, watered-down zone of “not quite
this” and “not quite that”. The middle ground, as
depicted by ES scholars, is a pragmatic, creative,
productive, and potentially progressive area. It is
constantly under assault from political currents with
more seductive slogans, but it is eminently worth
defending.
Applying ES ideas to SEA
Whatever its overlaps and struggles, this middle-
ground positioning allows the ES to facilitate conver-
sations between a range of opposite polls, and this, it
will be argued, is one of its major advantages in
interpreting the politics of SEA.
International societies, according to ES scholars,
are not all the same. “Thinner”, pluralist societies
stress the values of individual state autonomy, diver-
sity, and minimalism, while “thicker”, solidarist
societies seek a more ambitious level of cooperation,
in a wider range of areas, and with a higher tolerance
of enforcement. ASEAN’s pluralism, for example, is
often contrasted with the European Union’s
solidarism.
Normatively, too, individual ES scholars also
endorse different positions. “Pluralists” stress the virtues
of gradualism, tolerance, and the preservation of
diversity, while “solidarists” push for faster progress
and higher goals, with the aim of more quickly reach-
ing solutions to pressing problems. This article is
written from a pluralist perspective. This is partly
because that position best reflects where ASEAN
currently finds itself (as will be discussed in the next
section), but also because the vantage-point offered by
a pluralist perspective gives better traction in isolating
a distinctive ES position, and defending the middle
ground that is so vital in SEA.
The ES also has interesting arguments to advance
about the nature and role of non-state actors in SEA
(see Quayle, forthcoming), but these are beyond the
scope of the present article.
Early ES scholarship concentrated on the interna-
tional society that manifested itself at a global level.
More recently, however, interest has turned to “sub-
global international societies” (Buzan, 2004; Buzan &
Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2009; Hurrell, 2007). In this article,
therefore, ASEAN will be understood as the organiza-
tional expression of a regional international society (a
subfield of the global international society).
ASEAN does not technically need to exist for there
to be an international society in the region. ES
writers, keen not to distract attention from the
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underlying institutions of international society, tend to
portray inter-governmental organizations such as
ASEAN as part of its “auxiliary framework” (Jackson,
2000, 105). Of course, ASEAN as an organization is
important. It plays a significant role in symbolizing “a
shared commitment to fundamental international
institutions and principles” (Narine, 2006, 205), and
in testifying to its members’ desire to play a more
demanding regional version of the international
society game, in parallel with the minimal version that
exists on a global level. But ASEAN is essentially a
symptom of cooperation, not a cause. It is not surpris-
ing, then, that its hands are often tied. It is essentially
the servant, not the master, of the international
society that underlies it.
From the point of view of ES ideas, the interna-
tional society observable in SEA has succeeded in
identifying a number of common interests (reducing
vulnerability, maintaining independence, resisting
hegemonial threats inside and outside the region,
protecting sovereignty, promoting economic growth,
and bolstering regional order and stability) and
common values (consultation, non-aggression, non-
interference, and a sense of cultural distinctness). The
common institutions it has formed (sovereignty,
diplomacy, the pursuit of economic resilience, and
socially organized balancing strategies, including the
shaping of a role for great powers) reflect these inter-
ests and values, and indicate that SEA is essentially a
pluralist society. The fact that many of these values
and institutions are starting to shift, however, points
to a society that is also investigating moves towards
solidarism.
Scholarship that applies ES ideas to SEA is still
fairly limited in scope. The idea that SEA can be seen
as a regional international society, with ASEAN as the
outward expression of some of its institutions, has
been noted (Chong, 2009; Narine, 2006, 2008,
2009), as has the relevance to SEA, and to Asia more
generally, of ES ideas about order (Alagappa, 2003)
and power-balancing (Acharya, 2005; Emmers, 2003;
Goh, 2007/08; Khong, 2005; Odgaard, 2007).
Passing references note further potential connections
(for example, Acharya & Buzan, 2007, 289-290;
Bellamy, 2005, 23; Buzan, 2004, 238). But much
more remains to be explored.
RESULT AND ANALYSIS
CLAIMING THE MIDDLE GROUND IN SEA
An ES perspective can bridge two very obvious gaps
in the commentary on SEA: the realist/constructivist
gap on the relative importance of the themes of power
or community in the region; and the realist/liberal gap
on ASEAN’s community-building plans. This section
will look at these in turn.
POWER AND COMMUNITY – CONTRADICTION OR SYN-
ERGY?
It is hard to ignore a very definite power dynamic
in SEA. An ever-present awareness of relative power
and relative gain exists alongside a palpable sense of
competition and jostling. But it is equally hard to
ignore a very distinct community urge, with huge
amounts of political energy expended on ASEAN
processes and goals. Realist discourses tend to fore-
ground the power narrative, and dismiss the region’s
community impulses as mere window-dressing.
Constructivists, on the other hand, acknowledge the
reality of community, but often express disappoint-
ment with the continued salience of power. Describing
SEA in terms of only one of these themes is unsatisfac-
tory. Yet theorists experience difficulty fitting both
into a coherent framework.
There have been several attempts to resolve this
dilemma. Some theorists have attempted to devise
new theories, proposing “soft” realism (Peou, 2002,
135-136), or “realist institutionalism” (Khoo, 2004,
43-44), or “institutional realism” (He, 2006, 189,
195; 2008, 492), or “abridged realism” (Chong,
2006). But none of these solutions seems to fit the
bill, as this problem continues to draw scholarly
attention (Chiou, 2010, 373; Nesadurai, 2009, 104).
As a result, eclecticism – combining elements from
multiple theories – is often suggested as the best way
forward (see, for example, Batabyal, 2004, 350, 368;
Ganesan, 2003).
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The ES, however, intrinsically combines ideas of
power and community. Its concept of power is acutely
aware of the salience of material factors, but also sees
power as “a social relationship” (Northedge, 1976, 20,
127). Its concept of international society encapsulates
the idea that a group of states can share common goals
and develop common patterns of behaviour, while not
entirely turning their backs on power considerations.
And the ES’s societal dynamic, as noted above,
positions itself between much starker forms of power
on the one hand and community on the other.
It is therefore able to draw both narratives into an
integrated whole. A pluralist English School approach
need not share constructivist disappointment that
SEA’s states still strive for a balance of power in the
region and beyond (Acharya, 2001, 184-185; 2007,
37; 2006, 39; Busse & Maull, 1999), and would see
no incompatibility here with their creation of
ASEAN. It need not share realist surprise that SEA’s
comparatively small states attempt to manage extra-
regional powers by enmeshing them in frameworks
such as ASEAN Plus Three (APT), or the East Asia
Summit (EAS), since small powers have always con-
tributed to creating a socially-managed balance of
power (Wight, 1978, 160). In ES terms, none of these
forums should require states to surrender their power-
awareness at the door as they enter, but each provides
opportunities – for small and large powers alike – to
work on identifying the common interests and values
that are an essential part of societal behaviour. “Me-
first” realist behaviour is certainly visible in Southeast
Asia, and disputes over the South China Sea are
currently bringing these to the fore, but the power
strand has not – as yet, anyway – fundamentally
undermined what is essentially an internationalist
orientation.
As well as overcoming some of the discursive
incompatibilities of realist and constructivist narra-
tives, this ES picture encourages a recalibration of
expectations. States do not have to always move in
unison, or forsake all their instincts for self-preserva-
tion, to qualify for membership of international
society. The concept of international society exists to
explain the phenomenon of unlikely but actually
existing cooperation. It can therefore readily provide a
label for the activities of polities that have little
practice in cooperating as sovereign states, and little
incentive to trust each other, but nevertheless invest
large amounts of time, money, and energy in promot-
ing community-building activities. Rather than decry-
ing the shortcomings of ASEAN, an ES perspective
suggests modest gratification that its existence cel-
ebrates a desire and an ability to move beyond purely
minimal levels of cooperation.
In this area, then, the ES has much to offer. It can
capture the apparently incompatible power and
community discourses in one theoretically and histori-
cally grounded package, and provide a more modest
yardstick by which to evaluate ASEAN’s achievements.
The ES, however, also has much to learn from the
region in this area. ES theory is still not clear on how
regional international societies relate to the larger
societies in which they are embedded. How does
SEA’s international society, for example, connect
with, or nest within, its broader East Asian or Asia-
Pacific counterparts? If ASEAN is the superstructure of
a deeper international society, is this also true of the
APT or EAS? If so, how do these various levels of
international society – building from the states
represented in ASEAN, up through the APT and
EAS, to the global level – actually relate to each other?
Ongoing data from SEA will be crucial in learning
how to answer that question.
ASEAN’S COMMUNITY-BUILDING GOALS – ASPIRATIONAL
OR ACHIEVABLE?
The second discursive gap that ES narratives can
help to bridge is the one that has opened up over
ASEAN’s community-building plans. The Association
has clear ambitions to become a qualitatively different
kind of community, collaborating more deeply on a
broader range of issues. But the painful slowness of
progress in this direction attracts plenty of adverse
commentary. Liberal discourses tend to urge ASEAN
on to herculean (and as yet impracticable) feats of
community-building, regularly proposing various
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(usually extraordinarily complex and difficult) tasks as
essential “tests” that ASEAN “must not fail”  (there
are many instances of this technique, but see, for
example, Kavi Chongkittavorn, 2009; Miclat, 2009;
So, 2009). Realist narratives, on the other hand, see
ASEAN as, at best, a “diplomatic community” (Leifer,
2005, 138), and are highly sceptical of moves to create
anything deeper. Over much of the commentary, there
is a pall of pessimism. Ravenhill used to distinguish
between ASEAN “boosters” and ASEAN “sceptics”
(2009, 220). Now, however, boosters are rather too
thin on the ground.
Again, the ES can clear some middle ground. Its
scholars are acutely aware of the fragility of interna-
tional cooperation, so its expectations of “commu-
nity” are correspondingly modest. It therefore rejects
the liberal view that ASEAN is fundamentally faulty
because its cooperation has not yet taken off to higher
levels. However, an ES lens also recognizes and values
the societal element in international politics, and
embraces the idea that societies can consolidate.
Progress is difficult, but not impossible. It therefore
rejects the realist view that cooperation can only ever
be skin-deep.
The ES’s focus on underlying institutions similarly
acts as a reminder not to jeopardize the cooperative
practices that have supported ASEAN up to now by
trying to move too far too fast. This is by no means a
redundant reminder. Many of the underlying institu-
tions that were referred to in the previous section are
already under strain. Concepts of sovereignty are
shifting, but have not yet consolidated into something
new; Indonesia’s international profile has grown,
prompting regional concerns about abandonment or
domination; Myanmar is a constant challenge to the
institution of diplomacy; and the pursuit of economic
resilience is massively complicated by the vast socio-
economic disparities that criss-cross the region. As new
norms are forged, the ES acts as a reminder that the
basic institutions that have so far undergirded coopera-
tion developed in the particular way they did for a
reason. The institution of sovereignty, for example,
with its corollary of non-interference, developed
because of lack of trust. Modifying that institution
before the underlying problem of lack of trust has been
fixed is a possible route to trouble. If a bucket is being
used to deal with the problem of a leaking roof, there
is little to be gained by removing the bucket without
first fixing the roof. Non-interference is the bucket,
lack of trust the leak.
This is by no means a rejection of change. The
institutions of international society are always evolv-
ing, and there is nothing abnormal about the chal-
lenges that have been posed to SEA’s institutions in
recent years. But from an ES perspective, effective and
deep-rooted change depends on solid consensus.
The much-maligned ASEAN practice of consensus-
building is a great frustration for observers who want
to see ASEAN travel further and faster. But from a
pluralist ES perspective, consensus – even though it
might be painful to achieve – is a key criterion in
determining the speed with which international
societies can advance the scope of their cooperation.
In other words, “solidarism” depends on genuine,
consensual solidarity (Bull, 2002, 230-232, 305).
Enforcing more ambitious rules is one of the great
problems of solidarism. If states agree to take their
cooperation to higher levels, and agree on the rules on
which that cooperation will be based, then there is
theoretically no problem with the idea of those
mutually agreed rules being enforced. But for those
higher levels of cooperation to withstand the demands
of enforcement, they need to have been reached
through robust consensus. For enforcement to work,
states need to willingly agree to stricter rules, and to
the enforcement of those rules – not be coerced into
that agreement. Consensus is the horse, and interna-
tional law the cart – not vice versa (Vincent, 1990, 54-
57).
With consensus – which does not, of course, have
to equal unanimity, as traditional ASEAN practices
make clear – there is no practical or ethical limit on
the “thickness” of any given international society. It
can be as ambitious as it likes. But without consensus,
there are severe limits.
Consensus is not easy to forge. Bull notes that the
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process implies a willingness not only to eliminate
gross economic inequalities (2002, 314-316), but also
to recognize very different values and institutions
(1999, 155-156). Global international society struggles
with both these elements. Its prosperous liberal core
has had great difficulty with contemplating demands
for serious redistribution – whether these demands are
for a New International Economic Order, or for help
with tackling climate change. It has not taken seriously
the reality that fundamental disparities in economic
positioning and the differing needs of individual states
have a major bearing on the shape of global institu-
tions (Buzan, 2010, 25). This liberal core of global
international society has also found it difficult to
accept difference. Lacking global ideological conver-
gence, and too impatient to forge consensus, it has all
too often resorted to coercion in promoting its values
and interests, making many dubious decisions and
strongly reinforcing the hierarchical characteristics of
global international society in the process (Clark,
2009, 572-573, 580).
The coercive short-cut to solidarism easily goes
wrong. Those who are coerced readily become resent-
ful. And if the anticipated global power shift remains
on track, managing by coercion from the liberal core
will become an even less viable strategy (Bell, 2007,
43-47).
In terms of consensus-building practice, SEA has
much to teach global international society. Whatever
is made of the ASEAN Charter, it has to be acknowl-
edged that the fact that it appeared at all was a major
achievement for bridge-building diplomacy (Koh,
Manalo, & Woon, 2009). Whatever the inadequacies
of the ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on
Human Rights, the fact that it was established at all is
a huge step forward, and its Terms of Reference
provide a host of norm-building opportunities
(Haywood, Kaur, & Caballero-Anthony, 2010).
Yet, within SEA, too, the coercive route to
solidarism – despite its dubious success at global level
– often beckons too attractively as an alternative to a
consensus-building that is deemed too frustrating and
too slow. Demands for organizations, or rules, or
processes to be given “teeth” (that is, the capacity to
coerce) are very understandable. But without securing
genuine consensus on installing the teeth, they will
never truly be able to bite – or may end up biting the
wrong people. If solidarism-by-coercion is problematic
at global level, and too apt to create careless winners
and sore losers, it is doubly so within close geographi-
cal confines, and in a region where levels of inter-state
trust are already low, and divisions already problem-
atic. Consensus-building is easily criticized, but the
precise nature of proposed alternatives to consensus is
often left unexamined.
ES ideas therefore provide a valuable counter-
narrative on the question of community-building in
ASEAN. Unlike so much commentary, they do not
undervalue pluralist cooperation, or insist that
ASEAN has no utility until it dramatically raises its
game. They call attention to the ever-present dangers
of losing what is good in pursuit of what is better.
And by foregrounding the role of consensus in
solidarism, they shed a different light on a much
maligned aspect of ASEAN practice.
But the theory also has a lot to learn. It can
currently offer a diagnosis, but not much of a prescrip-
tion. It therefore stands to gain hugely over the
coming years from ongoing observation of ASEAN’s
community-building practice. The ES’s solidarist
scholars have traditionally focused on liberal ideals of
democracy and human rights as routes to solidarism.
But these are very difficult areas in which to forge
consensus in SEA. Its pluralist scholars have too often
been reluctant to contemplate solidarism at all. But
this is not a satisfactory recipe for SEA, where ambi-
tion for a deeper community cannot and should not
be simply turned off.
Some ES literature hints that a solidarist commu-
nity can be built on the basis of other areas of consen-
sus-building – such as identity, economics, or func-
tional cooperation – but it offers few further pointers.
It has much to learn from SEA, therefore, since these
are precisely the areas where ASEAN is at work, doing
its utmost to promote a regional sense of belonging
that will smooth the way to more region-focused
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policies, and striving to advance economic and other
functional cooperation in a way that will bring more
direct and material benefits to the region’s popula-
tion. In this sense, SEA resembles a giant construction
site aimed at turning a pluralist society into a solida-
rist one, and ES understandings of community-
building will be substantially enhanced by staying in
touch with ASEAN’s experiences over the next few
years.
INDONESIA THROUGH AN ES LENS
ES perspectives are also useful in evaluating
Indonesia’s position, both as a regional power and a
putative world power. The ES defines “great powers”
not only in terms of their material status (the reach of
their military, the size of their economy, the extent of
their natural resources, and so on), but also in terms
of their social status. By talking of great powers, Bull
argues, “we imply … the existence of a club with a rule
of membership”; we imply that certain states are
“accepted by one another and by international society
at large as having a common pre-eminence” (2002,
194). There is therefore a marked societal element
involved in defining great powers. They are in part who
we think they are. Great powers are also generally
considered by the rest of international society to have
not only special rights but special duties in that
society (Bull, 2002, 195-196). They may or may not
live up to this expectation, but the idea that it is the
responsibility of great powers to “do something” to
solve pressing problems is common at all levels of
political discussion.
Indonesia is the resident “great power” of SEA’s
regional international society. As an ASEAN member
under President Suharto, it generally conformed to
Bull’s descriptions of societally oriented great-power
behaviour, conscious of both rights and duties.
Former ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino
recalls that Indonesia was certainly “the big voice”, and
it was impossible to get things done without its
consent, but “one of the strengths of ASEAN was that
Indonesia lowered its profile, pretended that it was
just like the others” (interview, Singapore, February
2010). As a democratic polity, however, obliged to
mediate and reflect a range of domestic voices, Indone-
sia faces a much more difficult relationship. So does
ASEAN. Even as early as the Habibie administration,
Severino was told: “You cannot expect automatic
Indonesian support for ASEAN any more” (cited
interview).
Riding high in the world’s press as “the new India”,
“a steady democratic light in a dark Southeast Asian
tunnel”, and a “regional role model” (Anon, 2009b;
Manthorpe, 2009; Wehrfritz & Honorine, 2008), and
buoyed by its presence in the G20, its inclusion (along
with varying combinations of China, India, Japan,
South Korea, Indonesia, Australia, Brazil, and Russia)
in putative groups such as an “Asian G6” or “KIA” or
“BRIIC”, and its sense of being “increasingly indis-
pensable for Obama” (Emmerson, 2009; Ghosh,
2009; Jemadu, 2009; Parello-Plesner, 2009; Soesastro
& Drysdale, 2009; Thee, 2010), Indonesia has experi-
enced an international renaissance that has given
relations with its SEA neighbours a very different
edge. Leonard Sebastian, head of the Indonesia
programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of Interna-
tional Studies (RSIS) in Singapore, explains:
The Philippines and Thailand have had democratic
transformations, but it hasn’t affected them as much as it
has affected Indonesia. The Indonesians, because of their
size and their position, are courted by everyone – the
Europeans, the Americans, the Australians, the Japanese.
All have found an interesting new democratic friend. So,
it’s a completely new ball game. People come to Indonesia
now. That gives them a great sense of importance. It’s
different, for example, for other countries in the region that
have to work harder for that kind of recognition. Indone-
sia doesn’t have to work that hard (interview, Singapore,
January 2010).
This is a very challenging environment in which to
be a regional “great power”. Indonesia now feels –
entirely understandably – that it has the international
prestige and moral authority to advocate its model of
democracy and human rights to the other ASEAN
countries, and it clearly attempted to do that in
Linda Quayle
“ The “English School”, Southeast Asia, and Indonesia:  Locating and Defending
Productive “middle ground
JURNAL HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
VOL. 2 NO. 2 / OKTOBER 2013100
negotiations on the ASEAN Charter (Dosch, 2008,
533, 536-537, 543). This investment of diplomatic
effort met with difficulties on two fronts, however. On
the one hand, Indonesian pressure created resentment
among some regional players (interview, Ralf Emmers,
coordinator of the Multilateralism and Regionalism
Programme, RSIS, Singapore, January 2010). Yet, on
the other hand, the final document was still pro-
foundly disappointing to many strands of opinion
within Indonesia, leading to calls from prominent
commentators for a readjustment of Indonesia’s
commitment to ASEAN (Anon, 2009a; Sukma,
2008a, 2008b; Wanandi, 2008).
Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa has clearly
emphasized that “Indonesia’s interests and ASEAN’s
interests … are one and the same” (2010). Nevertheless,
Indonesia’s new status still occasions misgivings within
the region (Budianto, 2010; Desker, 2010; Noor,
2009), and its international renaissance provokes
“both anticipation and unease” (Anwar, 2010). Nor
does democratization necessarily equate with easing
the regionalization process (Rüland, 2009). As Em-
mers remarks, ASEAN’s situation is now “messier”.
The inevitable complications of democracy may slow
down moves toward integration on some fronts, and
this is “a very sobering realization” for the region (cited
interview).
A highly skilful political balancing act is therefore
required is to project into ASEAN the norms and
values that voting Indonesians very rightly want to see,
while still keeping the ASEAN ship on an even keel.
This is the old “policy dilemma” that ASEAN con-
stantly faces in trying to juggle the competing aims of
liberalization and unity (Katsumata, 2007, 38).
Severino likewise welcomes the multitude of voices
coming out of Indonesia, as it “expands the horizon”,
but he also notes the need for caution: “Would you
try to force things, and run into failure, or try to
build brick by brick? There are different notions of
that in Indonesia” (cited interview).
Aside from championing new norms, great powers
can also, according to Bull, play a role in the promo-
tion of international order (2002, 200). Half-way
through its year as ASEAN’s chair, and faced with very
elevated expectations and a host of tough problems,
Indonesia has arguably been doing a very good job of
demonstrating how this role might be played.
It can be a thankless task, especially in the context
of low levels of trust. In disputes such as that between
Thailand and Cambodia, Indonesia’s status as “re-
gional big power” can count negatively, if it is sus-
pected of “looking for a bigger political leverage within
the organization” (Nugroho, 2011). Yet it is difficult
to imagine any other ASEAN state that could have
weighed in so authoritatively to rein in this conflict.
Even if success is still elusive, Indonesia’s determined
efforts saved the organization a lot of face in the eyes
of the world, showing clearly that “ASEAN no longer
sweeps difficult problems under the carpet” (Sukma,
2011).
As a Thai opinion piece also notes, Jakarta’s
“ambition to transform ASEAN into a global game-
changer” is indeed “something no other ASEAN
member has so far dared to think of.”; it is therefore
“in the grouping’s common interest to support
Indonesia as chair, as … [a]n Asean that is in tune with
global changes and settings will benefit the whole
regional community” (Anon, 2011). This is not,
however, a function of Indonesia’s role as chair, but of
Indonesia’s role as regional big power.
Again, on the South China Sea issue, if “ASEAN
needs to remind Vietnam and the Philippines that the
group as a whole cannot and should not be expected
to blindly follow their national interests” (Tay, 2011),
then it is arguably only Indonesia that has the diplo-
matic heft to do this.
Indonesia faces a fearsomely complex challenge. It
needs to work for regional order by exerting the much-
needed authority that only a regional power can, while
avoiding the creation of disorder by provoking resent-
ment and fear. It needs to cement the position of an
“ASEAN community in a global community of
nations”, while avoiding too overtly giving the impres-
sion that it is helping ASEAN tackle its problems
because it is “hoping to raise its global profile”
(Bellman & Vaughn, 2011). But an ES vision of great
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powers gives it a much broader space within which to
develop that difficult role, and much more normative
guidance, than a narrowly neorealist one (Zala, 2010).
Again, however, the ES’s conceptions of power can
also be much enhanced from continued observation
of Indonesia’s role not only as a regional power but
also as a would-be world power. Ambitions for world-
power status have been clearly articulated (Anon,
2010; Bellman & Vaughn, 2011; Yudhoyono, 2011).
Yet, at the same time, many Indonesians – very
conscious, perhaps, of a range of domestic challenges
and of the difficulty of asserting authority within the
region – are somewhat ambivalent about their
country’s global status. The ES clearly recognizes, as
noted, the social dimensions of great-power status, but
has as yet paid little attention to self-conceptualization
as a factor in this status. Equally, it has much to learn
about the way powers move from a regional to a
global stage. Again, there is much scope for a profit-
able region-theory dialogue.
HOW USEFUL IS AN ES INTERPRETATION?
The ES has two clear drawbacks. Firstly, it is
complex. With its consciousness of multiple dynamics
at work in the world, and with its choice of pluralist
or solidarist standpoints, it offers not so much one
alternative lens as a whole range of calibrated options.
The counter-argument here, however, is that at least
there is a lens that fits SEA. Other theoretical view-
points struggle, as the first section of this article
showed, to deal coherently and holistically with the
many disparate dynamics that animate the region.
The second drawback, from the point of view of
some, is that the ES approach privileges “intentional-
ity” – what is intended by practitioners, and what they
understand themselves to be doing – rather than
causality (Navari, 2009). It is therefore not equipped
to pinpoint the precise circumstances that determine a
“me-first” decision as opposed to a more socially
responsible one, or predict when these circumstances
might next occur. There is little that can be said in
response to this objection – it is intrinsic to the
nature of the material, and will remain a frustration
for those looking for a different type of explanatory
leverage.
The ES’s chief advantage, on the other hand, lies in
opening up conceptual space. Its alternative narrative
– combining both power and community impetuses
in SEA, and rejecting both realist and liberal verdicts
on ASEAN – can contribute to solving some of the
discursive polarizations that trouble both analysis and
action in SEA. It can also tell a rather different
regional story, contesting what is often taken for
granted, correcting imbalances, and enabling a differ-
ent conceptualization of problems.
Its international society label, argues Wæver,
symbolizes “a continued effort to keep open a vital
thinking space” (1998, 129), and this space characteris-
tically colonizes and defends the “productive middle
ground” (Ayson, 2008, 54). Middle ground can bridge
polarized discourses and resist hegemonic ones.
Because it provides a different, more nuanced narra-
tive, it can also enable a different response. ES perspec-
tives on SEA suggest neither triumphalism nor despair
– but rather patience. Whether in diplomacy, opin-
ion-forming, or norm-changing, gradualism is the key.
But a region-theory dialogue does not flow only in
one direction. The ES has much to learn from SEA –
about the ways in which different levels of interna-
tional society (from regional to global) interlock;
about community-building in a heterogeneous and
non-liberal environment; and about power projection
in different contexts, and self-conceptualization as a
factor in great-power recognition.
The participants in this conversation do not yet
know each other very well. Exponents of an ES
perspective have only just begun to pay attention to
regions in general, and to SEA in particular. IR
analysts in SEA, on the other hand, tend to be
unfamiliar with the ES. The theories that have tended
to be dominant in the region – first realism, then
constructivism – are those that have gained traction in
the US (Chong & Hamilton-Hart, 2009).
The implication of this article, however, is that it
would be extremely useful for both theory and region
to continue their dialogue.
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This is all the more the case since the ES has
already demonstrated cross-cultural appeal. Zhang
notes that its ideas, despite their still limited influ-
ence, “find keenly receptive and responsive ears” in
China, especially among younger scholars (2003, 100).
Ultimately, what is needed to understand SEA is
home-grown theorization, evolving from the world-
views and lived experiences of scholars born and bred
within the region (Acharya & Buzan, 2007). But, at
risk of sounding presumptuous, the genesis of the ES
might also suggest one potential launching-pad for
that region-generated theory. The ES evolved because
its scholars located a paradox in international life –
what we see and experience in the inter-state environ-
ment (a high degree of order brought about by states)
is logically unexpected (because of an anarchic environ-
ment). It then discerned a third element that speaks to
that paradox (the ability of states to form an interna-
tional society, which then generates order). There is
surely much that is paradoxical within SEA. But
identifying these puzzles, and finding the “third
element” that links them, is a task optimally under-
taken by Southeast Asian scholars and practitioners.
In the meantime, it has been argued here, the ES
can very modestly suggest alternative perspectives that
help us to understand and talk about SEA differently
and productively.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that a pluralist ES perspec-
tive offers a number of possibilities that are useful in
analysing SEA. Its prime contribution is to help locate
the middle ground that is often missing from theoreti-
cal debates. Thus, it can bridge parallel discourses,
whether they be realist and constructivist, or realist
and liberal. It can encourage a less critical evaluation
of ASEAN, by providing a theoretical context for the
moderate voices in the ASEAN debate, and by en-
abling a fresh look at the vexed question of consensus.
It can also provide a socially oriented understanding of
the role of great powers – an understanding that
provides a much more subtle interpretation of what
Indonesia offers the region, and the challenges it faces
there.
This is not a one-way process, however, and the
theory can be substantially refined and extended by
remaining in close dialogue with the region.
Commenting on Bull’s seminal account of interna-
tional society, Hoffman writes that it may seem
“sketchy” in places, but it inspires a research agenda
that makes “all the competing paradigms look like
dead-ends, or like short and narrow paths” (2002,
xxix). This article sees paradigms as complementary,
rather than competing. It is not proposing, as noted
in the introduction, a “winner-takes-all” theoretical
scenario. But it does maintain, with Hoffmann, that
the region-theory dialogue it foregrounds is capable of
opening up a range of neglected routes that lead in
many new and interesting directions for both the ES
and SEA.
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